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The career of a policy concept 
A great deal can happen in the career of a concept, and the 25 year story of 'community safety 
policy' is no exception.  Many commentators identified the 1991 Morgan Report - entitled Safer 
Communities: The Local Delivery of Crime Prevention through the partnership approach -  as the 
catalyst for the emergence of this new field of integrated and developed crime prevention activity in 
the UK (for example, Crawford, 1994; Loveday, 1994; Squires, 1997; Hughes, 2002).  At the outset, it 
was widely presumed that the new concept could not fail to fundamentally change British 
approaches to crime prevention, it announced the opening up of an entire new field of policy 
intervention and practice (Gilling and Barton, 1997; Gilling, 2007).  But a lot can happen in twenty-
five years. This discussion focuses primarily upon developments and changes in the UK, but there are 
certainly wider resonances.  Although the chapter makes reference to relatively few non-British 
sources, similar changes have impacted in many other western neo-liberal societies.  Through a 
more theoretical lens, these recent British experiences also echo some of the issues first outlined by 
Edwin Schur in Radical Non-Intervention (1973) and Stanley Cohen in Visions of Social Control (1985). 
To begin with, the very idea of community safety had a lot going for it.  It drew upon several new 
approaches to questions of crime, risk and victimisation.  For example, aspects of the ubiquitous 
'broken windows' thinking (Wilson and Kelling, 1982), then very much on the ascendant in police and 
crime prevention policy and practice, which held that it was very important to address the visible 
symbols of crime and disorder and to reassure communities that problems were not going to be 
allowed to escalate. Addressing such issues, it was hoped, might also help address the fear of crime 
which, research was suggesting, could itself contribute to undermining a community's quality of life 
(Box et al., 1988; Hale, 1996).  That crime problems were to be 'nipped in the bud', as it were, led to 
a particular focus upon 'troubled' - often deprived - communities and especially the young people 
within them (Squires and Stephen, 2005).  In due course, the early interventionism which this set of 
concerns prompted, alongside the moral rearmament (Hughes, 1998) it often engendered - for 
which the notion of 'zero tolerance'  is often a convenient shorthand - paved the way towards the 
new mid-1990s focus upon 'incivilities' and 'anti-social behaviour' (ASB).  We will return to this 
theme and, as will be argued later, by the end of the 1990s, ASB as a policy priority ultimately came 
to eclipse important aspects of the wider focus upon community safety.   
A second emerging aspect of crime prevention thinking feeding into the community safety agenda 
concerned the 'left realist' perspective within a sociologically informed British criminology (Lea and 
Young, 1988) but also gathering strength and support especially amongst a number of Labour held 
local authorities.  Coming together, left realism focused particular attention upon the structures of 
victimisation and especially the hidden victims (young people, women, victims of domestic violence 
and sexual abuse and members of black and minority ethnic (BAME) communities).  Left realist 
criminologists were instrumental in implementing the first community-based crime surveys (Kinsey, 
1984; Jones et al., 1986;  Koffman, 1996) which interviewed representative samples of people to 
ascertain the real levels of crime experienced in localities, whether or not it was reported to the 
police. Such community crime surveys closely coincided with beginning of the British Crime Survey 
(in 1981) - now the Crime Survey for England and Wales (CSEW) - long regarded as a more reliable, 
although still far from complete, picture of crime rates in contemporary Britain.  A common finding 
was often that less than half the violence experienced by respondents (and especially violence 
against women and young people) was reported to the police (Mooney, 2000). Left realism explicitly 
acknowledged that patterns of inequality reflecting social class, gender and race discrimination were 
key aspects of what actively produced and sustained a persistent vulnerability to crime and disorder 
and made its consequences less easy to bear (for instance poorer households unable to afford home 
contents insurance, still less to move to a less crime prone area).  In addition, a number of 
assumptions prevalent in police and crime prevention circles often conspired to give youth, women 
as victims of domestic violence and black and minority ethnic (BAME) groups some of the worst 
experiences of the police and the criminal justice system.  In turn this served to deter them from 
reporting their experiences as victims to the police (Sampson and Phillips, 1992; Bowling, 1993); and 
so a vicious cycle of under-reporting - low prioritisation is perpetuated. In the case of some ethnic 
minority communities it is has been further suggested that 'cultural sensitivities'  (a racism of 
neglect) have delayed effective interventions to address a range of issues such as female genital 
mutilation, coercive arranged marriages, child sexual exploitation, slavery and drug trafficking 
(Norfolk, 2011) although the risk of over-constructing racialised criminal perpetrators is also a 
consideration here, as Cockbain (2013) reminds us. 
Reflecting the issues referred to already, central to the politics of left realism were two aspects of an 
idea of accountability. On the one hand this involved the idea that all of the victimisation 
experienced in a given community should be accounted for; on the other hand, in a strand of policy 
development tracing back to the Scarman Report (1981), it implied that the police, in responding to 
these crime and disorder issues, should be accountable to the communities that they served.  
Section 106 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act (1984) had already imposed a duty on the police 
to consult with their local communities regarding policing, police priorities and the delivery of 
policing services.  Developing this, some innovative local authorities, following a model established 
by the Labour-led Greater London Council (before it and the other, mostly Labour controlled, 
'Metropolitan' local authorities were abolished in 1986), had established police monitoring groups, 
determined to subject local policing to a closer critical scrutiny (Hughes, 1994).  Relations between 
the police and these groups were not always easy, but over time they undoubtedly helped 
contribute to a culture change in policing (Loveday, 2006; Jones and Newburn, 2001).  In any event, 
by the early 1990s, after over a decade of Conservative national government, Labour's political 
power base had been effectively confined to a number of larger,  urban, local authorities, so that any 
alternative to the dominant Conservative 'law and order' politics had to be built from the bottom up 
- from a localist perspective.  Accordingly, the new focus on local accountability, local policy 
interventions and addressing the inequality of victimisation in local communities was both a game 
changer for crime prevention and an opportunity for the Labour Party.   
These strands of new policy thinking came together with Left Realism within a new locally oriented 
commitment to community safety and crime prevention planning.  By the mid 1990s, these issues 
had been seized upon by Tony Blair, first as shadow Home Secretary and, later, as the Labour Party 
Leader. Labour's 'flagship' Crime and Disorder Act (CDA: 1997) incorporated many of the issues and 
ideas by establishing local Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships (CDRPs) which, in a 
commitment to 'evidence-led' local crime reduction and community safety planning, were required 
to undertake regular crime audits before setting their local policing priorities and targets.  However, 
much as the CDA brought into being a new infrastructure for accountable community safety policy 
and practice at the local level, it also embraced many of the existing tensions and inherent 
limitations that were also features of community safety policy-making. 
Community Safety: Tensions and limitations 
Amongst the criticisms made of the community safety 'project', and especially of its implementation 
under the auspices of New Labour's crime and disorder strategy, the following points, especially, 
stand out: 
The ASBO cuckoo in the Community Safety nest:   In the first place, the strategy might be accused of 
conflicted or ambiguous purposes.  Tony Blair had captured the law and order issue from the Tories 
with his oft-repeated 'tough on crime; tough on the causes of crime' slogan.  The slogan could be all 
things to all audiences, but which was it to be?  Notwithstanding the left realist focus upon victims - 
especially the victimisation of the poorest in the most deprived communities - the promise of 
community safety policy lay in an enhanced understanding of the role of inequality and deprivation 
in the simultaneous production of both criminalisation and victimisation. Acknowledging the role of 
wider social and economic inequality and discrimination in the production of crime and disorder 
posed a real problem where tough criminalising responses were called for in the case of offenders, 
especially persistent and prolific young offenders, the causes of whose delinquency often lay in their 
disrupted and unforgiving environments, their serial disadvantage and their lack of mainstream 
opportunities (Bottoms and Wiles, 1997; Farrington, 2002; Pitts, 2003).  Despite the infrastructure of 
support and early intervention and the youth offending teams, established by the CDA, the Act's 
very first section, introducing the Anti-Social Behaviour Order (or ASBO), reflected the deep 
ambiguity at the heart of this legislation.   
Very quickly, 'ASBO' became a by-word for unruly and troublesome (typically working class) youth, 
committing crime with apparent impunity, intimidating neighbours and terrorising whole 
communities (Squires and Stephen, 2005; Squires, 2008; Bottoms, 2006).  Anti-social behaviour was 
especially seen as exacerbating local perceptions of crime and disorder and a related sense of 
community decline, even as crime itself may have been falling.  Acts and behaviours that, in 
themselves, were unlikely to be regarded as serious or a priority for the police, when experienced 
day in day out for long periods, increased the local fear of crime, fundamentally undermining 
people's quality of life.  Hansen et al (2003) suggested that such problems of routine and on-going 
incivility also exposed an 'enforcement deficit', where the most pressing daily routines of low level 
harassment and abuse, which had the greatest cumulative impact upon the fear and insecurity of 
local residents, appeared to be the very issues that police were most reluctant to address and, partly 
as a consequence, the least amenable to police action (Hansen et al. 2003: 81).1   
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 As our later discussion of the Pilkington case (2009) makes clear, it seems fair to note that these problems 
were not 'solved' by the first phase of ASB policy-making. 
In due course, the hostile language of 'demonisation', 'feral yobs' and 'neighbours from hell' (Field, 
2003;  Nixon and Parr, 2006) - harking back to the media reaction to the James Bulger murder in 
1993 and looking forwards to the press and public responses to the 2011 English riots - and 
encapsulated in the moral discourse of 'Broken Britain', unreservedly blamed crime and disorder 
upon a sub-class of criminal perpetrators constantly preying upon a silent and long-suffering 
majority of the 'law abiding' (Tyler, 2013).  As Parr has noted, much academic work on ASB 
management was 'highly critical of the dominant discourse of ASB particularly because of the way in 
which it demonized those accused of such conduct (Parr, 2009: 371).   
This, essentially 'us' and 'them', conception of crime and disorder causation stood in marked 
contrast to the cohesive vision of deprived and vulnerable communities which lay at the heart of the 
community safety project. In time, as we shall see, the return to seeing crime as the property of a 
distinct class of 'criminals' ruining the lives of everyone else - the 'decent and law-abiding' - 
underpinned a final element of the Blairite criminal justice 'modernisation' project, the so-called 're-
balancing of law and order' (Tonry, 2010) intended to make the CJS 'fit for purpose' in the 21st 
century.  However, the corollary of Parr's (2009) earlier observation was that, whether chronically 
disadvantaged, the product of a dysfunctional family upbringing, or victim of serial abuse, or not, 
there were still perpetrators of anti-social behaviour making the lives of everyone around them a 
misery.  As we shall see, recognising this, another distinct strand of policy-making centred upon 
family support and intervention paved a path towards the 'Troubled Families' agenda (Parr and 
Nixon, 2008; Parr, 2011; 2012; Gregg, 2010), to which we will later return. 
The broad ambition of advocates of the community safety paradigm had embraced the idea of a 
wider discourse on preventing harm, risk and crime and disorder; tackling the causes of crime  and 
supporting both those at risk of criminal victimisation and those at risk of criminalisation, even by 
wider precautionary interventions, family support and behavioural compliance orders. However, 
reflecting the intolerant cultural turn against dysfunctional families and disorderly young people and, 
later, 'gangs', it became the enforcement aspects of anti-social behaviour management which came 
to the fore.  The ASB 'egg' had been nurtured in the community safety 'nest' and, over time, in a 
process not unlike the wider 'criminalisation of social policy' (Rodger, 2008), community safety 
priorities (housing, social care, street lighting, youth services) became subordinated to those of 
crime control and disorder management.  The ASBO cuckoo was displacing community safety policy 
from the nest.  These developments might even be reflected in the institutional arrangements 
adopted in different local authority areas.  Depending upon the political priorities set locally, ASB 
management might be a specific component within a broader and more widely conceived 
community safety department, or a housing department (Jacobson et al., 2005); in other areas a 
much reduced and relegated community safety unit dealing with more vulnerable victims or 
'problem families' might offer elements of community support within the context of a larger anti-
social behaviour management department (Edwards and Hughes, 2008).  As Hughes and Rowe, 
writing in 2007, noted:  'just as we saw the emergence of the new occupation of the community 
safety officer in the 1990s, so we are now witnessing the rise of the anti-social behaviour officer as a 
potentially new career path in the local governance of ‘problematic’ behaviour' (Hughes and Rowe, 
2007: 325). 
Democracy, accountability or local corporatism:  Continuing with the structural or institutional theme 
referred to above, a second area of tension within community safety policy concerned the forms in 
which the various interventions were delivered and the strings attached.  As we have noted, the 
'progressive/optimistic' strand of community safety thinking anticipated a substantial broadening of 
the older agendas of 'social crime prevention', such that wider questions of harm, disadvantage, 
discrimination and abuse - the hidden harms and victimisations - might be addressed. As Crawford 
noted in 1999, 'the ultimate aim' of community safety policy making was intended to be social and 
restorative, 'the revival of the communal bonds of informal control, the reintegration of the offender 
and victim within the moral community, and the restoration of communal order' (Crawford, 1999: 
509).  Yet in some cases the new policy regime appeared to discipline, divide and exclude.  This was 
especially the case in policies concerning racial tension, radicalisation and counter-terrorism where 
community cohesion itself become expressly the goal of the policy interventions. As we shall see, 
measures to prevent 'radicalisation' could often prove quite counter-productive (Spalek and 
Lambert, 2008; Husband and Alam, 2011).  
Furthermore, better evidence of local crime and disorder patterns and enhanced local consultation 
were expected to bring greater (police) accountability. As we shall see, in a rather selective sense, 
this might have been achieved although there is also evidence of something akin to the 'inverse care 
law' in health policy, in operation; those communities with the greatest need for crime prevention 
and community safety dialogue, investment and support, received the least of it. In fact they had 
social and collective resources withdrawn, services closed, reinforcing a growing distinction between 
communities in which forms of partnership persisted (town centre partnerships, chambers of 
commerce, CDRPs) (Hope, 2001; Coleman, 2004), and other communities seen as chaotic, 
irresponsible and lawless, for whom rather tougher policing and disciplining measures were required 
(Crawford, 1998; Lacey and Zedner, 2000). 
Research pointed to the establishment of more corporate processes of crime and disorder 
management (Crawford, 1994; 1997; Edwards, 2002).  The 'community safety' project, coincided to 
some extent with a number of developing ideas about the delivery of police and preventive services 
(Pratt, 1989).  Notions such as 'multi-agency', 'joined-up' or 'partnership' policing - amongst others - 
entered the contemporary policy lexicon alongside the recurring rediscovery of 'community policing' 
(Sampson, et al., 1988; Liddle and Gelsthorpe, 1994; McCarthy and O'Neill, 2014).  Yet the critical 
issue about multi-agency or partnership policing was that it was, in an important sense, always more 
about the agencies, and community governance, than about the community itself (Gilling, 1994).  An 
often cited anecdote about community safety planning might illustrate the dilemma: the university 
researcher might turn up at the 'community crime prevention' meeting, being held in the 
'community centre'.  Around the large table would be arranged a series of representatives from local 
partner agencies - or stakeholders - police officers, probation officers, social workers, people from 
housing, the youth service, education, public health, and so on.  Entirely absent were any members 
of the community - the people who lived there.  Rather, the meeting was populated with people for 
whom 'the community' was their job. As Lacey and Zedner (2000) have argued, 'community' became 
both a place (or context) and an ideology for the development of crime and disorder governance 
rather more than an active partner in the process of safety management.  And, as other researchers 
have noted, agency representatives interviewed often claimed that one of the real benefits of 
community safety partnerships lay in the impetus they gave to closer inter-agency working.  One of 
Millie et al's (2005) respondents remarked that their work was 'really bearing fruit in terms of 
building more effective inter-agency working’. The partnership benefits of certain types of 
community work were often mentioned, for example, one police superintendent interviewed argued 
that, if the police wanted to work more closely with other agencies in addressing crime problems of 
all kinds, a useful first step, presumably because it typically commanded widespread support, was to 
undertake joint work on youth nuisance behaviour (Millie et al., 2005). So, far from community 
safety implying an exclusively integrative rationale, the symbolic targeting of certain groups, and 
young 'unattached' black and working class males were never far from the top of the list, could often 
be the catalyst for community partnership making.  As we shall see later, such symbolic targeting 
and criminalising exclusion became an even stronger aspect of later ASB and crime and disorder 
management. 
Perhaps this tension between inclusion ('us') and exclusion ('them') was always inevitable given that 
the very appeal to the reintegrative qualities of 'community' in a wide range of service delivery areas 
was often predicated upon widespread acceptance of the decline or fragmentation of residential 
communities as a meaningful conception of urban and suburban belonging (Bauman, 2001). As 
Lacey and Zedner (1995: 301) put it, the question concerns 'the disjuncture between the demise of 
community and the growth of its rhetorical appeal'. The wider dilemma here is reflected in the way 
that, in Rose’s words, community became, ‘both the object and target for the exercise of political 
power, whilst remaining, somehow, external to politics and a counterweight to it’ (Rose, 1999: 168).  
In this sense, although in the short term, appeals to partnership in policing and crime prevention 
were initially understood as a potentially political and collective sharing of the burden of 
responsibility for crime and disorder management, in practice they tended to translate into rather 
more disciplinary forms of individual and family responsibilisation.  The collective foundations of 
community cohesion have been undermined as a matter of political choice 'by successive 
governments who have taken away power and resources from local communities' such that now, 
'facing the seemingly unmanageable consequences of social policies which celebrate the individual 
and denigrate the social' they find it necessary to constantly invoke the rhetoric of community 
(Lacey and Zedner, 2000: 158). 
Further evidence of the corporate dimension to many of the new crime and disorder governance 
interventions concerned the extensive audit and performance management targets often attached 
to this new area of work (Maguire and John, 2006).  We noted earlier that an important feature of 
the new approaches to community safety policy development were 'evidential' - specifically, 
evidence of the hidden risks, harms and crime victimisation that existing interventions failed to 
prioritise.  New Labour's culture of performance management was armed with new tools and 
technologies (audits, local crime analysis techniques, crime mapping, intelligence packages and the 
like) while embracing 'modernisation' and the 'new public management' philosophy (Hope, 2005; 
Stoker, 2004). Policy development was frequently defined as 'evidence led' (Tilley, 2001), even 
though this was much contested in practice (see Naughton, 2005).  The creation of such new 
performance targets entailed, according to Hughes and Rowe (2007), a number of cross-cutting 
tensions within the idea of community safety, not least because these 'targets' were often 
specifically crafted around numbers of arrests, charges brought, 'sanction-detections', 'offences 
brought to justice', disorder notices dispensed or ASBOs awarded.   
The performance target culture became subject to increasing criticism in its most institutionalised 
sense, but not in its more 'strategic' implications.  A variety of commentators (Morgan, 2007; 
Farrington-Douglas, 2009) came to criticise the police propensity to respond to the target-driven 
culture by going after the quickest and easiest 'wins', the 'lowest-hanging fruit' which led, in 
particular, to 'fast-tracking' and significant increases in the numbers of young people experiencing 
the newer entry-level measures deployed by criminal justice system (reprimands, final warnings, 
cautions, ABCs, dispersal orders and ASBOs) (see Newburn, 2011). After 2008, neatly coinciding with 
the post 'credit-crunch' austerity politics, numbers of young people entering the criminal justice 
system fell sharply (Squires, 2014b).  As we will discuss later, following the election of the 
Conservative-led coalition government in 2010, the precise series of youth and family interventions 
and ASB powers were reviewed and revised, although a new priority, targeting marginalised and 'at 
risk' BAME and working class youth became even more focused, especially following the Ending 
Gang and Youth Violence programme (HM Government, 2011) and through the Troubled Families 
initiative (Levitas, 2012; Hayden and Jenkins, 2014). 
Discipline, Surveillance and Selectivity:  A number of the remaining tensions and limitations inherent in 
emerging community safety strategies have already surfaced.  To a large degree many of these 
issues became increasingly apparent as the community safety policy field grew and developed and 
not just because, as we have noted, it came to be eclipsed by the newer ASB management agenda.  
Tensions were involved from the outset, while 'community safety' was a broad church, the single 
largest crime prevention intervention of the mid-to late 1990s comprised town centre CCTV 
installation.  During the late 1990s, approaching four-fifths of the entire Home Office crime 
prevention budget was allocated to match-fund CCTV development (Armitage, 2002; Goold, 2004: 
40).  Between 1999 and 2003 alone, a total of £170 million CCTV funding was made available to local 
authorities installing over 680 CCTV schemes in town centres and other public spaces (Home 
Office/ACPO, 2007: 7).  The way in which the money was allocated, match-funded grants to local 
authorities which had established town centre, police and business partnership schemes, in order to 
raise their own share of the project costs, pretty much guaranteed that the majority of the schemes 
would be located in town centres where the highest property values, largest retail outlets, financial 
institutions and prominent business premises - and therefore the resources - were situated.  These 
were, after all, the most likely sources of investment for the camera schemes and, in turn, their 
interests, the creation of safe spaces for business, leisure, tourism and consumption ('safer 
shopping') largely prevailed (Coleman, 2004).  Whether such priorities (compared with safer 
neighbourhoods, safer schools, or children's play areas) would ever score highest in any open public 
consultation about safety priorities is a rather moot point: those who paid the piper, called the tune.  
In any event, the central government CCTV funding, worked effectively, dangled as a carrot to 
incentivise the creation of public/private crime prevention partnerships in many towns and cities 
around the country and reinforcing the corporatist aspects of community safety. 
CCTV schemes shared an important characteristic with many other essentially 'situational' crime 
prevention initiatives in that the benefits they offered were often selectively targeted and selectively 
experienced.  As we have seen the beneficiaries of town centre CCTV were primarily the town centre 
business interests within the 'camera surveillance area' who had sponsored the schemes (Norris et 
al., 1998).  Like many private crime prevention initiatives (burglar alarms on private houses, 
enhanced vehicle security) the crime reduction advantages primarily accrue to those who make the 
security investment.  Market led security investment chiefly benefits those able to afford the initial 
investment and thereby widen the victimisation gap between the best protected and the 
unprotected.  In fact, the evidence on crime displacement (the shift in crime and disorder 
victimisation from protected areas to unprotected areas) in regard to CCTV was never very clear cut 
(Gill and Spriggs, 2005; Waples et al., 2009) but, in part, this was because the evidence about the 
effectiveness of CCTV was not especially compelling either.  Complicating the picture, some CCTV 
evaluations found evidence of a so-called 'halo effect', the diffusion of crime reduction benefits 
beyond the area within range of the cameras, but perhaps the most comprehensive meta survey 
exploring CCTV impacts concluded that (except in enclosed locations, such as car parks: Tilley 1993) 
public space surveillance cameras had relatively limited impacts on overall crime and disorder levels, 
needed complementing by other measures (police patrols and better street lighting) and were 
sometimes outperformed by improved street-lighting which carried the further advantage of 
appearing to reduce levels of fear of crime (Welsh and Farrington, 2006; 2008; Painter and Tilley, 
1999).   
When CCTV first appeared as a potential crime prevention technology in the early 1990s extravagant 
claims had been made representing it as a virtual panacea for preventing urban crime and disorder, 
but as the evaluations rolled out, and there were many of them (CCTV triggered a new fascination 
with surveillance in the social sciences in general), the initial optimism was punctured and a more 
qualified and considered understanding began to emerge regarding how CCTV worked, when - and if 
- it worked.  In particular CCTV was seldom effective in isolation, it needed complementing by 
intelligent policing; in due course, CCTV appeared to offer more to the police as an investigation and 
evidence gathering tool than as a prevention tool (although effective investigation, and prosecution, 
could also be a means of prevention).  In many areas new CCTV camera schemes were also 
established as part of a wider package of urban redevelopment initiatives designed to promote 
consumption, leisure and tourism, attracting potential high spending visitors and deterring others 
(street drinkers, beggars, the homeless, prostitutes, groups of young men) (Coleman, 2009).  This 
market-led and socially targeted facet of urban safety management led some to accuse city planners 
and crime prevention consultants of engaging in a de facto form of 'social cleansing' (Coleman, 2002; 
2004; Hubbard, 2004).  More generically, urban redevelopment, surveillance and securitisation were 
described as part of a 'revanchist city' movement (Smith, 1996) which involved the winning back of 
city space from the poorest, the marginal and socially excluded.  The movement itself was global in 
character but had its 'domestic' examples; at its softest it might take the form of incremental 
gentrification, gradually pricing out the poorest, more abruptly it could take the form, described by 
Mike Davis (in Los Angeles), of 'fortress cities' collectively 'hardening the surface of the city against 
the poor' (Davis, 1990) and panoptic shopping malls (McCahill, 2002) screening out the poor, the 
suspicious and the youthful - especially those wearing 'hoodies' (BBC News 11.05.05; Derbyshire, 
2005) 
Us and them:  The wider movement, of which market led securitisation, CCTV installation, and 
corporate community safety policy development were but parts, contributed, according to Hope 
(2001), to a marked redistribution in the experience of victimisation.  Analysed over the two decades 
since the first British Crime Survey in 1982, Hope concluded that the burden of routine victimisation 
(violent crime and property crime) had shifted significantly onto the poorest during this time.  In 
itself, this might not appear too surprising given widening inequalities in income and wealth in 
Britain during the 1980s and 90s (Rentoul, 1987; Blundell and Etheridge, 2010), and subsequently 
(Dorling, 2014), but it pointed to the dual failing of the left realist crime prevention agenda.  In the 
first place, although left realism had been predicated upon the recognition that the poorest and 
most marginal endured a disproportionate share of known victimisation (to say nothing of the 
hidden victimisations being exposed), they were often the least able to deal with this partly because 
crime victimisation often compounded an existing sense of vulnerability and social exclusion - such 
groups tended to receive the poorest service from the police and criminal justice system.  And now 
the evidence was pointing to an even greater and growing share of crime and victimisation falling 
upon their shoulders.  In the second place, many of the interventions: crime reduction strategies, 
programmes, technologies (such as CCTV), rationales, policing practices and legal changes which had 
blossomed and flourished under the community safety banner were most intensively applied in 
targeting the poorest and most socially excluded: BAME groups and 'unattached' working class 
youth, residents of sink estates, and various 'street populations'.   
The initial vehicle for this shift of enforcement emphasis was, as we have already seen, the New 
Labour anti-social behaviour strategy (Tonry, 2004), although this strand of policy making was itself 
decisively influenced by the post Bulger 'punitive turn' (Haydon and Scraton, 2000) which saw an 
expansion in processes of youth criminalisation (increased numbers of arrests, offences brought to 
justice and custodial sentencing) and fuelling what Kelly has termed an 'institutionalised mistrust' of 
youth and young people in contemporary Britain (Kelly, 2003; Stephen and Squires, 2004). Very 
quickly ASB acquired a central focus upon youth and young people (ASBO youth; ASBO 'yobs'), and 
although in large part this had always been fairly predictable (Squires, 2008), the substantial exercise 
in net-widening2 which followed, amounted to a major case study in the 'dispersal of discipline' 
(Cohen, 1985; Squires and Stephen, 2005). In turn, the new powers and innovative police and CJS 
working practices created under the auspices of the ASB management agenda helped develop the 
Blairite CJS 'modernisation' agenda and the associated 'rebalancing' of criminal justice to which we 
have already referred.  An intriguing example of these processes can be found in Osmond's (2010) 
discussion of ASB and its 'surveillant inter-assemblage'.  Although Osmond is describing 
institutionalised anti-social behaviour management practices in NSW, Australia, the processes 
described are directly comparable to similar information sharing and case management procedures, 
risk assessment protocols, the systems for accelerated intervention and the sidelining of 'due 
process', and 'extra legal', even 'precautionary', forms of regulation found in Britain.  As Crawford 
(2009) has likewise concluded of a range of ASB studies in Britain, new regulatory ideas, including 
'pre-crime' and precautionary interventions, are being used either to circumvent or undermine 
established precepts of criminal justice, in particular those of due process, proportionality and the 
special protections (anonymity, non-reporting) traditionally afforded to young people within the 
criminal justice system. As a consequence, new and innovative technologies of social control, 
enforcement and, ultimately, criminalisation, have resulted in more intensive, earlier and even 
arguably premature interventions (see also Squires and Stephen, 2010; Zedner, 2009; Creaney, 
2013). And as we shall see in the final section, youth justice has not been the only area to be 
influenced by these hybrid socio-legal regulatory powers. 
After Community safety? 
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  The notion of net-widening, essentially a 'fishing' metaphor, reflects the simple idea that a larger net would 
catch more fish; likewise widened social control would discipline more people.  The idea was most extensively 
developed by Cohen (1985) but applied by Squires and Stephen (2005) to ASB management.  Cohen's first use 
of the idea involved a critique of the 'alternatives to custody' discourse.  Alternatives he argued were, in 
reality, disciplinary extensions affecting more people. Other commentators (Austin & Krisburg, 2002) have 
argued that nets might have a variety of differing qualities, such as a tighter, finer mesh, capable of catching 
even the smallest 'fish' for the smallest of transgressions. 
The community safety policy field initially opened up whole new fields of community life to the 
processes of crime and disorder management. Later ASB policy gave a stronger focus and direction 
to this new field of governance, 'turning public policy into pest control' (Squires, 2014b). The range 
of new interventions rolled out under the auspices of the newly modernised and fast-tracked 
procedures of crime and disorder management: the ASBO, the Criminal ASBO (or CrASBO, awarded 
in conjunction with a conviction for a criminal offence), Penalty Notices for Disorder, Acceptable 
Behaviour Contracts, Closure notices, Gang injunctions (sometimes called GangBos), Dispersal 
Orders, Parenting Orders, and the like, substantially changed the landscape of routine crime and 
disorder management.  The highly flexible regime of ASB interventions has produced a pattern of 
enforcement action strongly oriented around broader and more fundamental inequalities and 
driven often by ideological judgments reflecting social divisions of class, ethnicity and identity.  Such 
tensions became even more acute in the context of post-2008 'austerity' politics especially 
combined with the various crime, disorder and ASB  strategies of the Conservative-led coalition 
government elected in 2010.  Such developments underpin Millie's (2008) astute observation 
regarding the shifting aesthetics of 'civilized and respectable behaviour', of tolerance levels and 
contested behavioural standards, at a time of fractured and fast changing social expectations.  The 
'austerity' context brought unwelcome demonizing attention to a host of these 'usual suspects': the 
poorest, the unemployed and ('undeserving') claimants, dysfunctional families ('neighbours from 
hell') and their offspring, unattached BAME and working class youth (the 'Chav' and the 'gangster') - 
and, more recently, refugees and migrants (see, inter alia, Jones, 2011; Tyler, 2013; Hancock and 
Mooney, 2012; Hallsworth, 2013; Anderson, 2013). 
A series of policy measures, evolving from the Conservative leadership's 'Broken Britain' discourse 
(Travis and Stratton, 2011; Flint and Powell, 2012; Hayton, 2012; Slater, 2014) and a sequence of 
policy reviews undertaken by Ian Duncan Smith's Centre for Social Justice think tank, profoundly 
framed the crime and disorder strategy of the Coalition government.  Three policy developments 
stood out: the much heralded reform of ASB management powers (Home Office, 2012), the strategy 
to tackle Gang and Youth Violence (HM Government, 2011) and the Troubled Families programme 
(DCLG, 2012).  The 2011 English riots were certainly an important accelerant to this trio of strategies, 
and while there were certainly important continuities with the ASB, early intervention and tackling 
gangs strategies of the outgoing Blair/Brown Labour Governments, the Coalition's proposals added 
emphasis, intensity and a sharper, new, political direction. 
Recognising that the ASB agenda always had two quite distinct aspects - in the first place 
acknowledging the cumulative harmful impact of relentless low level/pre-criminal and sub-criminal3 
harassment and, secondly, streamlining the due process constraints facing police response, a case 
occurred - a 'signal crime' (Innes, 2004) - which profoundly influenced the Coalition ASB reforms.  
After over of a decade of abuse and harassment endured by her family (including disability hate 
crime), during which time she had complained to the police on at least thirty occasions, Fiona 
Pilkington killed herself and her disabled daughter in 2007 (Britten and Rayner, 2009).  The case had 
loomed large in Conservative criticisms of the delivery of anti-social management support to the 
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  Pre-Criminal behaviours might include behaviour by children under the age of criminal responsibility, an age 
group now subject to Acceptable Behaviour Contracts (ABCs); Sub-Criminal behaviours might include forms of 
low-level nuisance behaviour (now called 'anti-social' behaviour) such as noise nuisance, neighbour disputes 
and begging which, even if they were covered by the criminal law, were seldom, if ever, prosecuted. 
most vulnerable victims and, launching the Coalition Government's white paper Putting Victims First 
in 2012 (Home Office, 2012), Theresa May spoke of the need for swift and effective remedies, long 
term solutions and the need for responsive and community accountable policing.  
In due course, the Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 replaced the existing ASB 
provisions with a more flexible series of powers and orders designed to exercise greater control of a 
wider range of criminal and pre-criminal behaviours.  The new Criminal behaviour order, for 
example, not unlike the preceding ASBO 'on conviction' (the CrASBO), issued following conviction for 
a criminal offence could add banning conditions (avoiding certain people, places, times and 
activities) and treatment conditions (accessing drug and alcohol treatment services).  The order 
comprises a principle of 'two-step criminalisation' (the first step attaches the conditions; the second 
step applies enhanced punishment: see Simester 2006) or what Ashworth and Zedner (2014) have 
lately described as 'preventive justice', breaching the attached conditions could result in a prison 
sentence of up to five years .  The proposals conferred new powers upon the police to 'disperse' 
(temporarily) anti-social individuals and, in conjunction with local authorities, to close premises 
(homes or businesses) where ASB has been - or is likely to be - committed, while procedures for 
seeking possession of troublesome premises have been streamlined.  Injunctions can be issued to 
prevent future misuse of public and residential areas (much like the preceding ASBO) while the 
public space protection order (PSPO) can impose behavioural conditions upon anyone using a 
designated area (behaviour that is 'unreasonable' (rather than illegal); continuing; and having 'or be 
likely to have, a detrimental effect on the quality of life of others in the locality': Home Office, 2014).  
Breach of a PSPO is a criminal offence punishable by a £100 fixed penalty notice or a fine.  Liberty, 
amongst other critics, have complained that the PSPO is too vaguely drawn and open-ended while 
the grounds for appeal are particularly narrow, and the penalties for breach can be issued by either 
the police or designated local authority officials (Liberty, 2015). There seems every indication that 
the marginalised 'usual suspects', especially unattached young men, will continue to bear the brunt 
of the new legislation, just as they did of what preceded it (Bottoms, 2006; Bannister and Kearns, 
2012). 
Two further features of the new ASB processes, intended to re-insert the 'community' and 
accountability back at the centre of ASB management, included the 'community trigger', designed to 
require an official response when three or more similar and related complaints had been received 
over the course of a six month period; and the 'community remedy', designed to give victims a say in 
community resolutions or offender reparation.  It may be that these latter measures, the precise 
arrangements for which remain to be seen, serve a more ideological function within the policy, by 
reiterating the supposed community centeredness of the overall package of proposals. 
As regards the 'longer term' measures announced by the Home Secretary, the proposals for tackling 
gangs and youth violence and for developing the Troubled Families programme both developed and 
supplemented initiatives from the preceding Labour Government (Squires, 2014a: 114; Bond-Taylor, 
2014): respectively the Tackling Gangs Action Programme (TGAP) and the Family Intervention 
Projects (Gregg, 2010).  Both sets of proposals shared a fundamentally individualistic perception of 
the roots of family failure and youth violence, reflected, above all, in a report on gangs and gang 
culture - Dying to Belong - from the Centre for Social Justice.  According to Iain Duncan Smith's 
preface, the report was centrally concerned with how another generation of young people 'plunged 
through violence and criminality to hopelessness and despair' - rather than the other way around, 
from hopelessness and despair (poverty, disadvantage and lack of opportunities, sometimes also 
racism) to violence and crime.  The report developed a narrative of individual pathways to criminal 
careers, and then violent gang lifestyles, noting that  'the modern gang is perhaps the best 
illustration of how broken Britain’s society is' (CSJ, 2009: 9). 
This same 'gang discourse' received a profound fillip following the English Riots of 2011 with 
government ministers initially claiming that 'gangs' were the cause of the riots (May, 2011), a claim 
that was subsequently modified in the absence of convincing evidence, to claim that 'gang culture' 
was a cause of the riots.  In any event, the riot experiences acted as a catalyst for the new 
Governmental programmes: more effective police enforcement interventions (such as gang 
injunctions, the joint-enterprise prosecution strategy and (in London) Project Shield, holding every 
gang member responsible for the crimes of the one: see Squires, 2016; Williams and Clarke, 2016) to 
address gangs and gang culture and interventions into the country's most chaotic and dysfunctional 
120,000 'troubled families'.   
The Troubled Families Programme (TFP) drawing significantly upon the successful Dundee families 
project (Nixon, et al. 2010), has become the principal means through which the criminogenic 
circumstances of a chaotic family life were to be addressed and dysfunctional families ‘turned 
around’.  Critics (Levitas, 2012) have argued that the TFP conflates poor families facing difficulty and 
disadvantage and families causing trouble; under the programme, 120,000 subject families were 
defined by reference to four criteria:  households with no adults in work; where children were not in 
school; where profoundly chaotic and dysfunctional family dynamics prevailed and where family 
members were often involved in crime and anti-social behaviour.  The programme provides all local 
authorities with intervention targets based upon the estimated number of designated ‘troubled 
families’ – the worst of the worst - in their areas, which, in the language of the TFP have to be 
'turned around'. As Nixon and her colleagues (2010: 308) acknowledged, family intervention projects 
(like social work itself) have always involved an element of care and control, support and sanctions, 
even though the success of the Dundee project was said to derive from its supportive ethos.  
However, translated to England, the TFP is not primarily designed to meet the needs of these often 
multiply deprived households (except so far as their needs are thought to primarily involve the work 
ethic and self discipline). Rather than address social welfare needs, the TFP is primarily intended to 
incentivise local authorities to get a grip upon these difficult families through a three year tapered 
regime of payment by results (Crossley, 2015). As Levitas has argued (2012: 12), 'government policy, 
has been demonstrated to entail rising unemployment, reductions and restrictions in benefits and, 
in particular, an assault on the living standards of families with children', this is the social context in 
which families encounter 'troubles'.  Furthermore, the Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS) predicted in 
2012 that, as a result of recent government policies, the numbers of children living in households in 
absolute poverty would increase while those in relative poverty would increase after 2013 (Joyce, 
2012). Yet despite this broader policy context, as Bond-Taylor has noted, 'concerns about criminality 
and ASB' rather than poverty and disadvantage came increasingly to shape the emerging 
governmental agenda (2014: 143).   
For each ‘troubled family’ identified and successfully engaged with, the DCLG makes available a fee 
of £4,000.  Part of this would be paid in advance, the rest subject to achievement of successful 
family outcomes, for example, targets such as: reduced rates of offending, a 60% drop in reported 
ASB, a reduced frequency of school exclusions, members of the household gaining employment or 
‘satisfactory progress’ towards work, or, finally, ‘at least one adult in the family moving off out-of-
work benefits into continuous employment in the last 6 months’ (DCLG, 2012: 9).  Under the TFP, 
family intervention and management have become the defining focus of neo-liberal social welfare 
strategy. Bell (2014) has described these policies as embodying their own 'anti-social' principles.  In 
like fashion, Phoenix (2009) has described the new measures as a kind of parsimonious and 
'repressive welfare'.  Parallels with Piven and Cloward's classic study, Regulating the Poor (1972); 
Donzelot's  Policing of Families (1979) and Wacquant's more recent Punishing the Poor (2009) are 
especially striking.  
In 2013 the Government announced a substantial expansion of the TFP, adding 400,000 further 
families to the original cohort being worked with, even though the House of Commons Public 
Account Committee noted that, by early 2014, only some 20% of the original number had been, in 
the terminology of the programme 'turned around' (Public Accounts Committee, 2014). Yet only a 
year later, May 2015, the DCLG claimed that fully 99% of those families engaged with had been 
successfully 'turned'.  As the independent programme evaluation had not yet reported, no evidence 
was provided to support this remarkable claim, leading commentators (Butler, 2015; Crossley, 2016) 
to argue that the extraordinary success claims were 'unbelievable' (Crossley, 2016: 6). 
Conclusions 
Individual commentators have described distinct aspects of different crime and disorder 
management programmes; the punishing, disciplining, regulating or policing of the poorest;  the 
targeting of disadvantaged or 'disconnected' young people, those at risk of either radicalisation or 
'gangsterisation', ethnic minorities and problem families ostensibly being 'turned around', by 
particular  policy interventions. Yet we began this discussion with the intention of reflecting critically 
upon a more, apparently coherent, vision of a new strategy for community safety development. 
Along the way, something rather more fundamental has been achieved, a profound refashioning of 
criminal justice interventions and processes.  
As was suggested at the outset, the idea of 'community safety' always involved rather more than just 
crime reduction but, as we draw towards the end of a thirty year policy cycle for the concept, it has 
become pretty clear that large areas of a broad range of socially inclusive and universal social crime 
prevention policies upon which community safety strategies rested, have been stripped away.  In 
their place a series of more selective, conditional and targeted interventions have been introduced.  
In place of a dualism, perhaps simply expressed, between care (or support) and control, or the 
meeting of needs and the imposition of discipline, interventions pulling in somewhat different 
directions, all the various intervention measures are now more directly aligned around behavioural 
compliance, moral reform and responsibility and labour market re-entry.  Earlier commentators 
(Levitas, 1996; Rodger, 2008) who identified the shifts occurring in the organising discourses behind 
public policy, perhaps most specifically arguments about the 'criminalisation of social policy' were 
amongst the first to acknowledge this.    
A second aspect, this more clearly reflected in the diagram of 'overlapping spheres' (figure one, 
below) concerns the multiplication of layers of policy intervention.  Many of these new layers have 
formed since the emergence of community safety, although there is a case to make that 'community 
safety' is where they flourished.  These new spheres of intervention include: much of the 'pre-crime 
compliance' measures, behaviour contracts and early interventions; the marked ramping up of 
welfare conditionality and benefit sanctions (although there are certainly many precedents for this 
Squires, 1990); the 'troubled families' programme itself; the entire anti-social behaviour agenda; the 
hybridisation of civil/criminal enforcement; the surveillance 'explosion'; the new collective-
responsibility gang initiatives (such as Operation Shield and 'joint-enterprise' prosecutions); and the 
'Prevent' strategy and counter-terrorism measures.   
Blairite aspirations towards a 'rebalancing' and 'modernisation' of criminal justice went part of the 
way to achieving some of these changes; the Coalition's reforms have reinforced and extended these 
innovations.  The diagram attempts to capture something of the interlaced spheres of crime control, 
justice and injustice, compliance, conditionality, administrative targeting, surveillance, pre-criminal 
'precautionary' intervention, hybrid-legality, prevention oriented early intervention, collective 
responsibilisation, enforcement selectivity and streamlined due process presently characterising the 
'new' criminal justice and, therefore, how multi-level governance through crime is now delivered. 
A third feature of the new criminal justice, reflected in the diagram, is that, just as there are several 
new layers of criminal justice intervention, so each these layers has produced some distinctly new 
techniques of intervening, disciplining, surveilling which, having proved effective, have also found 
their applications in other areas.  The two-step criminalisation provisions, as described by Simester 
(2006) are a particular case in point.  They had their origin4 in the ASBO, where the first step entailed 
the attachment of a behaviour order; the second step, exposure to a much enhanced range of 
penalties, would follow any breach of that order.  This principle has now been extended in respect of 
dangerous offenders, gang-involved offenders, violent, organised, and terrorist offenders.  A range 
of pre-criminal or 'precautionary' interventions find their application from behaviour compliance 
measures through to the new anti-social behaviour controls, although styled as 'preventive justice' 
by Ashworth and Zedner (2014).  Finally, while forms of network surveillance  and specialist 
targeting find applications across the several layers of criminal justice, the utility of hybrid civil/legal 
procedures and streamlined due process in, for example, criminal asset recovery or terrorism, 
prevention and investigation measures (TPIMs) remains. 
Figure 1:  Overlapping spheres of discipline, surveillance, targeting and justice  
 
The argument is not that this recently transformed field of criminal justice activities was a direct and 
inevitable result of the original, localised, 'joined up', and 'left-realist' informed community safety 
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 Perhaps recent origin would be a fairer reflection given that English law, in previous times has applied a 
certain category status to various kinds of offender - vagrant, beggar, 'common prostitute' as a prelude to 
more punitive treatment.  The 1908 Prevention of Crime Act, likewise, could see 'incorrigible' or 'habitual' 
offenders subject to additional longer sentences in order to 'prevent' future crime. 
strategies of the early 1990s.  Rather it is suggested that, the development path to the new criminal 
justice reflects certain internal weaknesses and  ambiguities of the community safety discourse itself 
and, subsequently, the ways in which this policy was rather eclipsed by an all-conquering ASB 
agenda.  That these changes also reflected the changing ideological tenor of 'law and order' and the 
reprioritisation of crime victims during a period in which efficient, target-driven, crime and disorder 
management became the sine qua non of good governance and popular neo-liberal politics, only 
added to the transformation.  Politicians of both parties referred to these processes in positive terms 
as promoting the needs of victims and favouring the law abiding majority: speeding up justice, 
ensuring more offenders were brought to justice, and 'rebalancing' system as a whole.  In 
Wacquant's (2009) terms, as the welfare arm of the state underwent a marked neo-liberal 
retrenchment, and a number of the more punitive features of social policy came to the fore, so the 
dispersed disciplinary potential of early interventionist and 'pre-criminal' targeting also expanded. At 
the same time hybrid legal principles, streamlined due process and 'two-step' targeted interventions 
also began to feature more significantly in higher end police and prosecutorial systems. The final 
dimensions of the segmented system of justice represented in figure 1 were only completed in 2015 
by the passage of the Serious Crime Act (2015) which marked a further synthesis of aspects of the 
Tackling Violence and Gang Strategy (HM Government, 2011), the Serious and Organised Crime 
Strategy (HM Government, 2013) and the Government's evolving Counter-Terrorism Strategy 
(McCulloch and Pickering, 2009), all of which adopt and adapt aspects of the 'community safety' and 
ASB strategies of earlier years. In a sense these various strategies are still centred around an idea of 
'community safety', but this policy concept has undoubtedly changed and how these measures 
achieve it, how well they achieve it and, perhaps above all, who for whom they achieve it - the 
questions with which we opened this discussion - have changed as well. 
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